



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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## **National Intelligence Daily**

*Thursday  
21 April 1983*

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25X1

## **Contents**

---

**Libya-Brazil-Nicaragua: Decision on Aircraft** ..... 1

25X1

**China-Vietnam: A Warning From Beijing** ..... 3**Italy: Early General Election Possible** ..... 4

25X1

**Chad: Dissident Maneuvering** ..... 7**USSR-Iran: Status of Relations** ..... 8

25X1

**Honduras: New Subversive Front** ..... 10

25X1

**CEMA: Negotiations for a Summit** ..... 11

## **Special Analysis**

**Poland: Prospects for Unrest** ..... 12

25X1

**Top Secret**

25X1


21 April 1983

**Top Secret**




25X1


**LIBYA-BRAZIL-NICARAGUA: Decision on Aircraft**

*Brazil's decision to send the Libyan aircraft that were destined for Nicaragua back to Tripoli without their cargo of arms has complicated relations with Libya.* 

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Brazilian spokesmen have announced that the weapons probably will be returned later. No mention has been made of whether the transports are carrying aircraft. 


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Libyan leader Qadhafi is publicly criticizing his officials for not revealing the contents of the aircraft to "friendly" Brazilian authorities. Earlier he demanded the return of the arms. 

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
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**Comment:** Brazil will try to extricate itself from the incident without further antagonizing Libya. Both countries want to keep recent bilateral military deals intact. 


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21 April 1983

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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### **CHINA-VIETNAM: A Warning From Beijing**

*Beijing's recent statements and its increased military activity suggest that China will at least continue to harass the Vietnamese until they end their dry-season offensive in Kampuchea.*

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**Comment:** Beijing, despite its saber-rattling, probably wants to keep its military activity limited to artillery attacks, reconnaissance patrols, and small ground operations. The clashes could grow, however, if Vietnam retaliates against China or expands its operations into Thailand. The Chinese might try to administer "another lesson" by concentrating a large force to overwhelm and destroy an isolated military or economic target.

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**ITALY: Early General Election Possible**

*Party leaders may be about to force an early general election.*

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Renewed tension among the members of Prime Minister Fanfani's four-party government is prompting speculation that the parliament will be dissolved on 12 May. Party officials expect that this would open the way for national elections to be held on 26 and 27 June, concurrently with partial local administrative elections. Fanfani says privately that early elections are likely and that he will discuss the matter with President Pertini.

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Former Prime Minister Spadolini, who heads the small Republican Party, is the only party chief now calling publicly for an early election, but the Communist Party's daily newspaper is reporting the election speculation enthusiastically. The Socialists are to meet tomorrow to decide whether to withdraw their support from the government.

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**Comment:** A national election would be unlikely to produce major shifts in parliamentary strength, but even minor gains could prompt Socialist leader Craxi to try to persuade the other center-left parties that he should be prime minister. Craxi's cautious decision to support Fanfani last year rather than demand a national election damaged his reputation as a decisive leader. This could impel him to act now, even though some of his lieutenants will argue that the party may grow still stronger if it waits.

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
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**Top Secret**

21 April 1983

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**CHAD: Dissident Maneuvering**

*Libyan-backed dissidents are trying to mount guerrilla operations against government forces in western Chad while both sides continue preparing for hostilities in the north.* [ ]

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The US Embassy in N'Djamena reports that President Habre is concerned about recent Libyan reconnaissance flights over the Kanem region in the west. Last week rebel patrols were sighted in the area for the first time. Insurgent recruits have reportedly begun infiltrating the region from refugee camps in northern Nigeria, and some military officers in Benin claim that the Libyan arms delivered to Cotonou last month will be shipped through northern Nigeria to the Kanem area. [ ]

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**Comment:** If the dissidents begin operating in the Kanem region, both the area around N'Djamena and Habre's only supply route to the north could be threatened. The majority of government troops are tied down in the north, and Habre does not have the resources to counter a new threat. [ ]

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Each side appears capable of defending its most important positions in the north. The rebel position at Ounianga Kebir remains vulnerable, however, and Habre's troops are likely to attack it soon. The dissidents have the men and equipment to attack government forces but currently seem to lack the will to strike first. [ ]

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The French probably will offer only limited quantities of arms and equipment. If a direct intervention by Libya appeared imminent, however, they would be likely to increase their aid. [ ]

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**USSR-IRAN: Status of Relations**

*Tensions between Moscow and Tehran remain high over a variety of issues, but there have been recent indications that both sides are seeking to limit the deterioration in relations.* [ ]

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The chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department visited Tehran early this month for talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister. [ ]

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The Soviet Government expressed condolences over the earthquake in northern Iran early this month, and Ayatollah Khomeini officially thanked Moscow. Iranian media noted last weekend that a Soviet aircraft had arrived in Tehran with relief supplies for the earthquake victims. [ ]

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A new Iranian Ambassador arrived in Moscow last week, filling a post that had been vacant for more than a year. At about the same time, the Soviets announced that Aeroflot flights between the two capitals will resume soon. [ ]

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**Comment:** [ ]

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[ ] The small but positive signs since his visit suggest that the talks resulted in some progress toward limiting the decline in relations. [ ]

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Nevertheless, fundamental differences persist on such issues as the USSR's support for Iraq, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and Tehran's repression of Iranian Communists. These make a significant improvement in relations any time soon unlikely. [ ]

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
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**HONDURAS: New Subversive Front**

Four Honduran extreme leftist groups recently announced from Managua that they have formed a new unity organization dedicated to solidarity with the Sandinistas and increased violence. The new front includes the most radical Honduran groups, which were responsible for most of the numerous bombings and kidnappings last year. The announcement coincides with a statement by Nicaraguan junta leader Daniel Ortega threatening Honduras with renewed subversion. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Ortega's statement may be a warning to Tegucigalpa to review its position concerning the training of Salvadoran troops in Honduras, the installation of a US-manned radar system, and its support of insurgency against the Sandinistas. The Honduran extremist groups are divided, but they have some ability to attack US and Honduran targets—especially if the Sandinistas provide assistance. The orthodox Honduran Communist Party, which has been unsuccessful in its terrorist experiments, is conspicuously absent from the front. The Communists apparently have set up political headquarters in Managua, however, thus strengthening their ties to the Sandinistas. [REDACTED]

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**CEMA: Negotiations for a Summit**

A high-level Soviet delegation visited Bucharest last week and discussed preparations for the still-unscheduled CEMA summit. Bucharest radio has reported that the talks with President Ceausescu dealt with the need to expand cooperation within CEMA and the question of energy and raw material supplies. The delegation also visited Budapest. Meanwhile, a leading Soviet expert on CEMA last week said the summit will react in part to developments at the Williamsburg Summit late next month.

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**Comment:** The delegation probably sought to persuade Romania and Hungary to drop their opposition to closer integration, but the effort is unlikely to have succeeded. Moscow apparently is waiting to see what policy emerges at Williamsburg before further defining its views on trade ties with the West.

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## **Special Analysis**

### **POLAND: Prospects for Unrest**

*Some demonstrations are likely in early May despite government threats of retribution and suggestions that protests could jeopardize the papal visit in June. The authorities are prepared to quell open acts of defiance, but an extensive use of force would undercut their claims that the situation is gradually returning to normal. The Church probably will not consider postponing the Pope's visit unless there is widespread violence and bloodshed.* [ ]

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In 1982 the first major demonstrations against martial law occurred on May Day and on 3 May, Poland's prewar constitution day. Thousands of Poles in a dozen cities participated in the protests.

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[ ]  
[ ]  
[ ] The US Consul  
in Krakow reports plans for a demonstration under the guise of a  
"peace" march. [ ]

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In recent weeks the underground's five-man Temporary Coordinating Committee has called for similar demonstrations in May and for a boycott of official celebrations. There is no evidence, however, that the Committee expects a massive turnout. [ ]

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### **Walesa's Role**

Former Solidarity leader Walesa indicated last month to US Embassy officers that he wanted to help maintain calm in early May. His recent meeting with the Temporary Coordinating Committee and his indirect support of its appeal for demonstrations, however, may lead to wider popular involvement. [ ]

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Since his release from internment last November, Walesa has gradually become more active by signing appeals and by meeting with former union advisers and the underground. Walesa probably has been frustrated by the regime's efforts to ignore him, and he is likely to derive some satisfaction from the publicity resulting from his recent harassment by the authorities. [ ]

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### **The Government's Response**

The Minister of the Interior publicly warned on 22 March that the authorities would not tolerate the planned demonstrations. On Tuesday the government and the party issued another warning that demonstrations could delay normalization and the lifting of martial law. [ ]

In addition, the police have tried to intimidate prospective leaders and participants in demonstrations. They recently have arrested several dozen underground activists, shut down illegal printing presses, and confiscated illegal radio transmitters. They also have arrested a former union spokesman and have increased harassment of those close to Walesa. [ ]

To identify potential trouble spots, the government announced earlier this week that the military's Special Operations Groups would be sent out to numerous cities and villages. These groups previously have been useful in assessing the public mood. [ ]

Government leaders also have tried to enlist the Church more directly in preventing demonstrations. They are arguing that opposition forces are seeking to force the Vatican to postpone the Pope's visit. [ ]

Church leaders believe that demonstrations would serve no useful purpose. According to Western journalists, Cardinal Glemp met briefly with Walesa on Sunday. Glemp may have asked Walesa to use his influence to prevent demonstrations—advice that Walesa apparently is now less willing to heed. [ ]

### **Outlook**

The demonstrations probably will not reach the size or scope of those of last August, when about 125,000 people took to the streets. Most Poles are no more ready to challenge the authorities now than they were last year, and the prospective papal visit will inhibit participation. [ ]

If necessary, the authorities will use the range of tactics they have perfected to disperse demonstrators. The regime probably will seek, however, to avoid resorting to excessive force. In addition to using the papal visit to demonstrate a return to normality, the government wants to persuade Western governments to remove sanctions. [ ]

In the weeks following the demonstrations there could be a period of general calm. The Temporary Coordinating Committee is not likely to call for additional large-scale protests before June, because it believes that a papal visit will improve morale and lead to a greater popular willingness to support and engage in antiregime activity. [ ]

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